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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1
Amicus curiae, the American Center for Law & Justice (“ACLJ”), is an
organization dedicated to defending constitutional liberties secured by law. ACLJ
attorneys have argued before the Supreme Court of the United States and other
federal and state courts in numerous cases involving constitutional issues. E.g.,
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009); McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93 (2003); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384 (1993). ACLJ attorneys also have participated as amicus curiae in numerous
cases involving constitutional issues before the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts.
The ACLJ has been active in litigation concerning the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(“PPACA”). The ACLJ filed amici curiae briefs in Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-2388 (6th
Cir. Dec. 15, 2010), and Florida v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d. 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
Additionally, the ACLJ represents the plaintiffs in Mead v. Holder, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592 (D. D.C. February 22, 2011), appeal filed, No. 11-5047
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 1, 2011), another case challenging the individual mandate’s
1

This brief is filed with the consent of the parties.
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constitutionality on the grounds that it exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause
power. The ACLJ has an interest that may be affected by this case because any
decision by this court would be persuasive authority in Mead.
This brief is also filed on behalf of United States Representatives Paul
Broun, Robert Aderholt, Todd Akin, Michele Bachmann, Spencer Bachus, Roscoe
Bartlett, Rob Bishop, John Boehner, Larry Bucshon, Dan Burton, Francisco
“Quico” Canseco, Eric Cantor, Steve Chabot, Mike Conaway, Blake Farenthold,
John Fleming, Bill Flores, Randy Forbes, Virginia Foxx, Trent Franks, Scott
Garrett, Louie Gohmert, Ralph Hall, Tim Huelskamp, Bill Johnson, Walter Jones,
Mike Kelly, Steve King, Jack Kingston, John Kline, Doug Lamborn, Jeff Landry,
James Lankford, Robert Latta, Donald Manzullo, Thaddeus McCotter, Cathy
McMorris Rodgers, Gary Miller, Jeff Miller, Randy Neugebauer, Steve Pearce,
Mike Pence, Joe Pitts, Mike Pompeo, Scott Rigell, Phil Roe, Ed Royce, Lamar
Smith, and Tim Walberg, all members of the United States House of
Representatives in the One Hundred Twelfth Congress.
This brief is also filed on behalf of the Constitutional Committee to
Challenge the President and Congress on Health Care, which consists of over
70,000 Americans from across the country who oppose the individual mandate.
Amici are dedicated to the founding principles of limited government, and to the
corollary precept that the Commerce Clause contains boundaries that Congress

2
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may not trespass no matter how serious the nation’s healthcare problems. These
amici believe that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to require
that people purchase government-approved health insurance or pay a penalty.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court has held that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress
to regulate economic activity. Contrary to the government’s thesis, the Commerce
Clause has never been understood to encompass all “conduct” that affects interstate
commerce. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has twice repudiated the argument
that the Commerce Clause is that elastic. The Commerce Clause does not authorize
Congress to regulate the inactivity of American citizens by requiring them to buy a
good or service (such as health insurance) as a condition of their lawful residence
in this country. The decision not to engage in interstate commerce is not interstate
commerce. Because the individual mandate provision of the PPACA requires
citizens to purchase health insurance or be penalized, the PPACA exceeds
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.
The individual mandate’s unconstitutionality requires the entire PPACA to
fall. Although an earlier version of the health care legislation contained a
severability clause, the PPACA does not, and, by the government’s admission, the
PPACA’s remaining provisions cannot function without the individual mandate.
These two factors lead inexorably to the conclusion that Congress would not have

3
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passed the PPACA without the individual mandate. Consequently, because the
individual mandate provision is unconstitutional and not severable from the
remainder of the PPACA, the entire PPACA must be held invalid.
ARGUMENT
I.

SECTION 1501 OF THE PPACA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE IT EXCEEDS CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE.
The Supreme Court has recognized that
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated
powers. See [U.S. Const.] art. I, § 8. As James Madison wrote, “the
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous and indefinite.

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting The Federalist No. 45,
at 292–93 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)).
When President Harry Truman sought to expand federal power over a
substantial portion of the economy by seizing American steel mills, the Supreme
Court was keenly aware of the threat to the Constitution and to Americans’ liberty.
As Justice Frankfurter explained in his concurring opinion, to provide effective
“limitations on the power of governors over the governed,” this Nation’s founders
[R]ested the structure of our central government on the system of
checks and balances. For them the doctrine of separation of powers
was not mere theory; it was a felt necessity. . . . These long-headed
statesmen had no illusion that our people enjoyed biological or
psychological or sociological immunities from the hazards of
concentrated power. . . . The accretion of dangerous power does not
4
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come in a day. It does come, however slowly, from the generative
force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the
most disinterested assertion of authority.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Federalism, and the restriction of
Congress’s power to certain enumerated ends, is as much a part of the
constitutional plan to limit “the power of the governors over the governed” as the
separation of powers. By acting beyond its enumerated powers in forcing
Americans to buy government-approved health insurance or pay a penalty,
Congress has disregarded the constitutional restrictions that are meant to protect
individual liberty.
A.

Section 1501 Far Exceeds the Boundaries of Congress’s
Commerce Clause Power as Delineated in Supreme Court
Precedents.

Article I, Section 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian tribes.” Although this power’s scope has been held to be broadened
from the original understanding of a power to “prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196
(1824), the Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress’s assertion and
exercise of this power has limits.
A review of four key Commerce Clause cases demonstrates that Section

5
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1501 of the PPACA exceeds the outer bounds of Congressional power under the
Commerce Clause and underscores that the district court correctly decided that the
individual mandate is unconstitutional.
In particular, the Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to
“regulate” inactivity by requiring individuals to buy a good or service (such as
health insurance) as a condition of their lawful residence in the United States. Nor
does the clause ignore the line between abstract decision-making and concrete
economic or commercial activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.
The Commerce Clause does not license Congress to force new participants into a
market to benefit existing, willing market participants, nor does it give Congress
carte blanche to include unconstitutional provisions within a larger scheme
regulating commercial activity.
1.

Neither Wickard nor Raich supports a power to regulate
inactivity.

In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Supreme Court upheld
provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act that authorized a penalty to be
imposed on Filburn for growing more wheat than the marketing quota set for his
farm. The Act restricted wheat production to limit supply and stabilize market
prices. Id. at 115. Filburn grew more than twice the quota for his farm. He
typically sold a portion of his wheat in the marketplace, used a portion to feed his
livestock and family, and kept the rest for future use. Id. at 114–15. He argued that
6
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the Act exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power because the activities
regulated were local and had only an indirect effect upon interstate commerce. Id.
at 119. The Court upheld the Act, stating that “even if appellee’s activity be local
and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature,
be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce. . . .” Id. at 125.
The Court reviewed a summary of wheat industry economics that outlined
the interrelationship between market prices and wheat supply in local communities,
the United States, and the world, id. at 125–28, and observed that “[t]he effect of
the statute before us is to restrict the amount [of wheat] which may be produced for
market and the extent as well to which one may forestall resort to the market by
producing to meet his own needs.” Id. at 127 (emphasis added). In other words,
the penalty targeted farmers who, like Filburn, grew far more wheat than the
amount needed to fill their own demand in order to sell most of the excess in the
market.
Wickard does not support Section 1501. The statute in Wickard targeted a
specific economic activity—over-producing wheat, the excess of which was often
sold in the market—which substantially affected prices in the interstate market for
that commodity. The statute regulated farmers who were growing and selling
wheat. Wickard thus does not stand for the proposition that Congress may regulate

7
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all “conduct”—including the “act” of deciding not to engage in commerce—that
has, in the aggregate, a substantial effect on interstate commerce, as the
government argues. Br. for Appellant 17, 30-34. Rather, the Court, in Wickard,
held that Congress may regulate purely local economic activity (growing a
marketable commodity that may be sold in the market or consumed by the grower)
when that economic activity, in the aggregate, is directly tied to and substantially
affects interstate commerce. See also Florida v. United States Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1164 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (rejecting similar
argument that Wickard expanded the Commerce Clause to encompass “economic
decisions” affecting interstate commerce). In short, all economic activity is
conduct, but not all conduct is economic activity for Commerce Clause purposes.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), the case most relied upon by the
government, goes no further than Wickard did. In Raich, the Court considered
whether Congress could regulate marijuana grown and consumed within a state as
part of a broader scheme regulating interstate markets for marijuana. Id. at 9.
Under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which created a “closed regulatory
system,” manufacturing, distributing, or possessing marijuana was a criminal
offense. Id. at 14. California residents who wanted to use marijuana for medicinal
purposes under state law brought a suit alleging that “the CSA’s categorical
prohibition of the manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the

8
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intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant
to California law exceeds Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause.” Id. at
15 (emphasis added).
The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge. The Court noted that the
plaintiffs did not contend that Congress lacked the power to regulate manufacture
and possession of marijuana. See id. at 9. From that premise, the Court went on to
note that “[o]ur case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely
local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 17 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).

Moreover, “[w]hen Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a

practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.” Id.
(citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154–55 (1971)). As such, “when ‘a
general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis
character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’”
Id. (citation omitted).
The Court stated that Wickard’s key holding was that “Congress can regulate
purely intrastate activity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced
for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut
the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.” Id. at 18. The Court
declared that in both Wickard and the case before it, “the regulation is squarely

9

Case: 11-1057

Document: 104-1

Date Filed: 03/28/2011

Page: 17

within Congress’ commerce power because production of the commodity meant
for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply
and demand in the national market for that commodity.” Id. at 19. Importantly, the
Court emphasized that “the activities regulated by the CSA [including the
plaintiffs’ activities] are quintessentially economic. . . .”

Id. at 25 (emphasis

added).
Because the manufacture and distribution of marijuana was an economic
class of activity that Congress could regulate,
Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a
gaping hole in the CSA. Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted
comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible
commodity, Congress was acting well within its authority to “make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to “regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8. That the regulation
ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have
done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of
that larger scheme.
Id. at 22.
The Court described the marijuana ban as “merely one of many ‘essential
part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.’” Id. at 24–25
(quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
In contrast to Raich, this case is not an as-applied challenge to a concededly
valid regulatory scheme. Rather, Plaintiffs here contend that Section 1501 exceeds
10
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Congress’s authority and should be declared unconstitutional. Thus, Raich’s
emphasis on courts’ reluctance to prohibit individual applications of a valid
statutory scheme due to the de minimis nature of the impact of the plaintiff’s local
conduct is inapposite to this case.
In addition, the statute in Raich (like the statute in Wickard) sought to
discourage an ongoing “quintessentially economic” activity:

“the production,

distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established,
and lucrative, interstate market.” Id. at 25–26. The Court repeatedly emphasized
that the substantial effects test governs the authority of Congress to target
“activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities.’” Id. at 17 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted). Since the statutory scheme was concededly valid, the
Court presupposed that “the [regulated] class of activities . . . [was] within the
reach of federal power.” Id. at 23. By contrast, Section 1501 does not regulate an
ongoing economic class of activities “within the reach of federal power.” See id.
Lawful presence in the United States, without more, is not an economic activity
akin to producing and distributing a marketable commodity.

Raich does not

support the idea that Congress may regulate abstract decisions to not purchase a
good or service—that is, to not engage in commerce—and force people to purchase
that good or service.
Wickard and Raich held only that federal regulation of a particular type of

11
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economic activity—producing and consuming a marketable commodity—can, in
some circumstances, be applied to reach that type of existing economic activity at a
purely local level when doing so is necessary and proper to the effective national
regulation of that economic activity. They do not stand for the broad proposition
that Congress has free reign to pass otherwise unconstitutional laws by including
them within a larger regulatory program.
2.

Lopez and Morrison repudiate the government’s argument
the Congress’s Commerce Clause power encompasses all
“conduct” that substantially affects interstate commerce.

The Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) establish that the
Commerce Clause cannot be stretched to encompass all “conduct” that affects
interstate commerce. In Lopez, the Court held that the Gun Free School Zones Act,
which prohibited possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school, exceeded
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because it had “nothing to do with
‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define
those terms.” 541 U.S. at 561. The Court discussed Gibbons v. Ogden—the Court’s
first comprehensive review of the Commerce Clause—which stated that
“‘[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It
describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all
its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that

12
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intercourse.’” Id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189–90). The Gibbons Court
observed that the power to “regulate” commerce is the power to “‘prescribe the
rule by which commerce is to be governed’” and noted that “‘[t]he enumeration [of
the power] presupposes something not enumerated.’” Id. (quoting Gibbons, 22
U.S. at 194–95, 196); see also id. at 585–88 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that
the original understanding of the Commerce Clause was much more limited than
the Court’s modern interpretation).
The Lopez Court reiterated the observation made in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), that the Commerce Clause
[M]ust be considered in the light of our dual system of government and
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce
so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex
society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is
national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government.
Lopez, 541 U.S. at 557 (citation omitted). The Court identified three “categories of
activity” that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities. Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes
the power to regulate those activities . . . that substantially affect
interstate commerce.
Id. at 558–59 (citations omitted).
The Court summarized cases dealing with the third category of activity as
13
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holding that, “[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce,
legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.” Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
The Act exceeded Congress’s authority because gun possession was not economic
activity. The Court found it significant that the Act “‘plows thoroughly new
ground and represents a sharp break with the long-standing pattern of federal
firearms legislation.’” Id. at 563 (citation omitted).
The government argued in Lopez that the Court should focus on whether,
through a chain of inferences, possessing guns in a school zone could, in the
aggregate, be reasonably thought to substantially affect interstate commerce, rather
than focusing on whether the statute targeted economic activity. Additionally, the
government cited the cost-shifting impact on the insurance system, arguing that
gun possession may lead to violent crime, and “the costs of violent crime are
substantial, and, through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread
throughout the population.” Id. at 563–64; see also Brief for the United States, at
*28, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (No. 93-1260), 1994 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 410 (footnote omitted).
In rejecting the government’s unduly expansive view of congressional
power, the Court found significant
the implications of the Government’s arguments. The Government
admits, under its “costs of crime” reasoning, that Congress could
regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to
violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate
14
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commerce. . . . Similarly, under the Government’s “national
productivity” reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity that it
found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens:
family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for
example. Under the theories that the Government presents in support
of § 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power,
even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where
States historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by
an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.
Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
The Court concluded that the Constitution “withhold[s] from Congress a
plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation,”
id. at 566, and stated that
To uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police
power of the sort retained by the States. . . . To [so expand the clause’s
scope] would require us to conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration
of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, . . . and that
there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what
is truly local.
Id. at 567–68 (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also id. at 577–78
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the importance of federalism principles in
interpreting the Commerce Clause’s scope).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), reinforced Lopez’s teaching
that the Commerce power does not extend to all “conduct” that substantially
affects interstate commerce. In Morrison, the Court held that a portion of the
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Violence Against Women Act, which provided a civil remedy for victims of
sexually-motivated violence, exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority
because “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity.” Id. at 613 (emphasis added). Congress found that sexuallymotivated violence deters interstate travel and commerce, diminishes national
productivity, increases medical costs, and decreases the supply of and demand for
interstate products, id. at 615, but the Court rejected the argument “that Congress
may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s
aggregate effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 617. The Court noted that cases
in which it had upheld an assertion of Commerce Clause authority due to the
regulated activity’s substantial effects on interstate commerce involved the
regulation of “commerce,” an “economic enterprise,”
“some sort of economic endeavor.”

“economic activity,” or

Id. at 610–11. The Court observed that the

government’s attenuated method of reasoning was similar to the reasoning offered
in Lopez and raised concerns that “Congress might use the Commerce Clause to
completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local
authority.” Id. at 615.
Section 1501 does not withstand scrutiny under Lopez and Morrison. Being
lawfully present within the United States, like possessing a gun within 1,000 feet
of a school, is not a commercial or economic activity. The cases Lopez relied upon
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referred to ongoing commercial or economic activities that Congress may
regulate,2 and provide no support for the assertion that the power to “‘prescribe the
rule by which commerce is to be governed’” includes the power to force those
who do not want to engage in a commercial or economic activity to do so. See id.
at 553 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196).

As in Lopez, “[t]o uphold the

Government’s contentions here,” would “bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained
by the States.” Id. at 567.
As the district court rightly concluded, Section 1501 “literally forges new
ground and extends Commerce Clause powers beyond its current high watermark.”
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 609 (E.D. Va. 2010).
Judge Roger Vinson agreed with this point in another challenge to the PPACA, in
which he wrote, based on the pertinent Commerce Clause and Necessary and
Proper Clause cases, that the “power that the individual mandate seeks to harness
is simply without prior precedent.” Florida v. United States Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1163 (N.D. Fla. 2010).

There have been

many times throughout American history when changing market conditions was a
desirable goal, yet

2

See, e.g., United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196.
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never before has [Congress] used its commerce power to mandate that
an individual person engage in an economic transaction with a private
company. Regulating the auto industry or paying “cash for clunkers”is
one thing; making everyone buy a Chevy is quite another. Even during
World War II, the federal government did not mandate that individual
citizens purchase war bonds.
Randy E. Barnett, Is Health-Care Reform Constitutional?, Wash. Post, Mar. 21,
2010, at B2. Although the PPACA is the first federal law to cross the line between
encouraging increased market activity and mandating individual purchases, it will
certainly not be the last if it is upheld.
Lopez and Morrison establish that the power to regulate commerce is the
power to regulate commercial or economic activity, however local or trivial in
scope (at least so long as that local activity in the aggregate could reasonably be
thought to substantially affect interstate commerce). One does not engage in
commerce by deciding not to engage in commerce. Even the most expansive
Supreme Court Commerce Clause cases do not support the notion that Congress
can regulate inactivity or coerce commercial activity where none exists.
B.

The Government’s Argument that the Commerce Clause
Empowers Congress to Regulate All “Conduct” that Affects
Interstate Commerce Swallows All Meaningful Limits on
Commerce Clause Power.

Although the government refers repeatedly to the decision not to purchase
health insurance as “conduct” within the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause
power, that elastic label is no more availing than the term “economic decisions”
18
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was in Florida v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d
1120, 1163 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (holding that economic decisions should not be
equated with economic activity for Commerce Clause purposes). Both terms are
fatally flawed because they destroy any remaining boundaries on Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause.
Applying the government’s argument to obesity illustrates the point.
Although genetic predisposition plays a role, the exponential increase in obesity
results in significant part from human conduct: overeating, poor food choices,
sedentary lifestyle habits. The link between obesity and rising health care costs is
indisputable. In September 2010, the Congressional Budget Office reported that
health care spending per capita for obese adults exceeded spending for non-obese
adults by about 8 percent in 1987 and by about 38 percent in 2007.3 CBO projected
that if current levels of obesity do not diminish, “[P]er capita spending on health
care for adults would rise by 65 percent—from $4,550 in 2007 to $7,500 in 2020.”4

Congressional Budget Office, Economic and Budget Issue Brief: How Does
Obesity in Adults Affect Spending on Health Care? 1 (Sep. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/118xx/doc11810/09-08-Obesity_brief.pdf.
4
Id.
3
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The Center for Disease Control has estimated the health care costs
associated with obesity at $147 billion annually.5 Another study done recently by
the National Bureau of Economic Research estimates annual obesity-related costs
at closer to $167 billion, or nearly 17% of total health care costs.6
Moreover, the rise in health care costs caused by obesity is shifted onto other
consumers in much the same way that increased costs stemming from uninsured
persons are shifted. In fact, obesity adds about $2,800 to the average person’s
annual health care costs.7 As another study concluded, “Obesity also has
externalities associated with it—namely, mortality and health insurance costs.
Because medical costs are higher for the obese and premiums do not depend on
weight, lighter people in the same pool pay for the food/exercise decisions of the
obese.” 8
The market incentives to regulate obesity among American citizens are
5

Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Study Estimates
Medical Cost of Obesity May Be As High as $147 Billion Annually (July
27, 2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2009/r090727.htm.
6
John Cawley & Chad Meyerhofer, The Medical Care Costs of Obesity: An
Instrumental Variables Approach, 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. 16467, 2010), available at
http://www2.binghamton.edu/economics/research/Meyerhoefer.pdf
7
Id.
8
Jay Bhattacharya & Neeraj Sood, Health Insurance, Obesity, and Its Economic
Costs, in The Economics of Obesity: A Report on the Workshop Held at
USDA’s Economic Research Service 21, 21 (Tomas Philipson et al. eds., 2004),
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/efan04004/efan04004.pdf.
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arguably as compelling as those motivating the individual mandate. If, as the
government argues, the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate all
“conduct” that, in the aggregate, affects the health care market, Congress could
impose federal limitations on body-mass index, the measure that standardizes
weight according to height. Such a law would be justified with the same arguments
the government uses to defend Section 1501.
Similarly, Congress could determine that a lack of exercise—sedentary
conduct—contributes to poor health, which increases health care expenses and the
cost of health insurance, and threatens Congress’s attempt to lower health care and
health insurance costs. Thus, under the government’s reasoning, Congress could
require Americans to purchase health club memberships.
While the foregoing scenarios might seem farfetched, a recent hearing
before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the PPACA’s constitutionality revealed
they are not. The possibility of a “vegetable mandate” and compelled gym
memberships were discussed at this hearing. While defending the individual
mandate’s constitutionality, former Solicitor General and Harvard law professor
Charles Fried testified that under the view of the commerce power that would
justify the mandate, Congress could, indeed, mandate that everyone buy vegetables
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Cf. Mead v. Holder, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at

*55–56 (D.D.C. February 22, 2011) (finding for Commerce Clause purposes little
distinction between economic activity and “mental activity, i.e., decisionmaking”).
As noted, principles of federalism and a limited federal government, like the
separation of powers, are part of the system of checks and balances essential to
limiting centralized governmental power and protecting liberty. Upholding the
individual mandate would effectively confer upon Congress “a plenary police
power,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566, over all individual economic decisions and place
Americans’ economic liberty at risk. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinell v. Sebelius, 728
F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010). This court should reject the government’s
invitation to recognize such a broad power.
II.

BECAUSE SECTION 1501 IS NOT SEVERABLE FROM THE
REMAINDER OF THE PPACA, THE ENTIRE ACT IS INVALID.
Generally, holding one provision of a law unconstitutional does not

invalidate the rest of the law if the unconstitutional provisions are severable.

9

The Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Congress 4 (2011) (statement of Charles Fried, Professor, Harvard
University), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-0202%20Fried%20Testimony.pdf
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Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987). Section 1501 is not severable.
Therefore, the PPACA is invalid in its entirety. .
“The inquiry into whether a statute is severable is essentially an inquiry into
legislative intent. ” Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S.
172, 191 (1999). “Congress could not have intended a constitutionally flawed
provision to be severed from the remainder of the statute if the balance of the
legislation is incapable of functioning independently.” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S.
at 684. A court must ask “whether [after removing the invalid provision] the
[remaining] statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent of
Congress.” Id. at 685 (alteration in original) (original emphasis omitted).
Two factors demonstrate that Congress did not intend Section 1501 to be
severable: First, Congress removed a severability clause from an earlier version of
health care reform legislation; second, the PPACA’s remaining portions cannot
function “in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress” without Section
1501. See id (original emphasis omitted).
The Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962), which the House
approved on November 7, 2009, contained an individual mandate section as well
as a provision that stated, “[i]f any provision of this Act, or any application of such
provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the
remainder of the provisions of this Act and the application of the provision to any
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other person or circumstance shall not be affected.”10 However, Congress did not
include H.R. 3962’s severability provision in the final version. That Congress
decided not to include a severability clause in the PPACA as enacted is strong
evidence that Congress did not intend for the statute’s individual provisions to be
severable. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983) (“Where
Congress includes [specific] language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it
prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the [omitted provision] was not
intended”) (alteration in original).
Second, Congress itself believed the individual mandate is absolutely
essential to PPACA’s primary purpose of making health insurance universally
available and affordable.
[I]f there were no [individual mandate], many individuals would wait to
purchase health insurance until they needed care. . . . The [individual
mandate] is essential to creating effective health insurance markets in which
improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not
exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.
PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(I), as amended by § 10106(a). Consistent with the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Alaska Airlines, Congress could not have intended the
individual mandate to be severable if severing it would allow an inoperable or

10

H.R. 3962, § 255, 111th Cong., 1st Sess., Bill Summary & Status,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.3962: (click on “Text of
Legislation,” then the link for “Affordable Health Care for America Act
(Engrossed in House [Passed House]-EH)”).
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counterproductive regulatory scheme to stand. See 480 U.S. at 684; accord Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161–62
(2010). The PPACA forbids providers from refusing health insurance coverage to
individuals because of preexisting conditions.

PPACA § 1201.

Without the

individual mandate, a person could refuse to purchase health insurance until he
became injured or ill and required medical care. Without the individual mandate,
the resulting free-riding could soon cause any private or co-operative insurance
provider that depends on premium dollars to become insolvent. The PPACA
contains exchanges made up of insurance providers, but does not contain any plan
completely administered and supported by the government.

Because the

envisioned insurance providers would depend upon premium dollars, the
individual mandate is essential to bolster the providers’ solvency in each insurance
exchange and thus the operation of the entire regulatory scheme.11 See Florida v.
United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1162–63
(N.D. Fla. 2011) (collecting numerous statements in government briefs
highlighting the essential role the individual mandate played in Congress’s effort to
reform the health insurance industry).
11

This is not to say that the connection between the individual mandate and the
rest of the PPACA, while relevant to the severability issue, is a basis for
concluding that the individual mandate is within Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause, as argued previously in this brief.
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Because the individual mandate is so essential to the PPACA’s overall
operation, the most reasonable conclusion to draw is that Congress could not have
intended the individual mandate to be severable from the rest of the PPACA. In
fact, it is fair to say that without the individual mandate, it is highly probable there
would be no PPACA. These observations, along with the fact that Congress
deleted a severability provision from an earlier version of the national health care
reform legislation, lead inexorably to one conclusion: the individual mandate is
not severable from the PPACA’s remaining provisions.

Thus, because the

individual mandate is unconstitutional, this court should hold that the entire
PPACA invalid.
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CONCLUSION
This court should affirm the district court’s judgment that PPACA is
unconstitutional, and reverse its judgment that the individual mandate is severable
from the rest of the statute.
Respectfully submitted,
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